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Why is combinatorial communication rare
in the natural world, and why is
language an exception to this trend?
Thomas C. Scott-Phillips1,† and Richard A. Blythe2,†
1Evolutionary Anthropology Research Group, Department of Anthropology, Durham University, Dawson Building,
South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK
2SUPA, School of Physics and Astronomy, University of Edinburgh, James Clerk Maxwell Building, Mayfield Road,
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In a combinatorial communication system, some signals consist of the
combinations of other signals. Such systems are more efficient than equival-
ent, non-combinatorial systems, yet despite this they are rare in nature. Why?
Previous explanations have focused on the adaptive limits of combinatorial
communication, or on its purported cognitive difficulties, but neither of
these explains the full distribution of combinatorial communication in the
natural world. Here, we present a nonlinear dynamical model of the
emergence of combinatorial communication that, unlike previous models,
considers how initially non-communicative behaviour evolves to take on a
communicative function. We derive three basic principles about the emergence
of combinatorial communication. We hence show that the interdependence of
signals and responses places significant constraints on the historical pathways
by which combinatorial signals might emerge, to the extent that anything
other than the most simple form of combinatorial communication is extremely
unlikely. We also argue that these constraints can be bypassed if individuals
have the socio-cognitive capacity to engage in ostensive communication.
Humans, but probably no other species, have this ability. This may explain
why language, which is massively combinatorial, is such an extreme exception
to nature’s general trend for non-combinatorial communication.
1. Introduction
In a combinatorial communication system, some signals consist of the combi-
nations of other existing signals. The most basic version involves two individual
signals that are combined to refer to something that is not simply the amalgama-
tion of whatever the two individual signals refer to, but something different. In
other words, combinatorial communication includes at least one composite
signal, whereas in non-combinatorial communication, all the signals are holistic
(figure 1). For example, putty-nosed monkeys are reported to have two distinct
alarm calls, one for each of two predators: leopards (a ‘pyow’ sound) and
eagles (a ‘hack’ sound) [1,2]. When one or the other of these calls is produced
on its own, the monkeys take appropriate evasive action: climbing up and into
the trees for leopards; climbing down and into the bushes for eagles. However,
when the two calls are produced together (‘pyow–hack’), the effect is not the
simple combination of these, i.e. the monkeys do not behave as if avoiding both
types of predator. Instead, the call seems to presage the movement of the group
to a new location (perhaps, for example, because there is a shortage of fresh
food at the present location).
Combinatorial communication has one obvious adaptive advantage over
equivalent non-combinatorial systems: fewer elements are required to express
the same number of possible messages, and so it allows for more efficient com-
munication than a system in which each signal has a distinct form [3]. Despite
this potential advantage, it is rare in nature, and where it does exist it is, with
one salient exception, simple and limited [4,5]. Many systems (e.g. honeybee
& 2013 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
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dance) have a signal which has an effect that is equal to the
sum of its component parts, but very few have a signal
whose effect is different to this sum (in the terms of figure
1, Z ¼ X þ Y is common, but Z= X þ Y is not). The salient
exception is human language, which is massively combina-
torial. Indeed, there are multiple different types of
combination that can contribute to meaning. Otherwise, the
only well-attested examples are the putty-nosed monkey
case described above.
Why, then, is combinatorial communication so rare, and
why is language such an extreme exception? One possible
explanation might be that combinatorial communication is
cognitively challenging in some way [6,7]. However, why
this should be the case is unclear: there is no particular
reason to think that signal combinations should be difficult
to process. Other previous explanations have focused on
the limits of the adaptive benefits of combinatorial communi-
cation. One analysis shows that the benefits associated with
combinatorial communication are realized only when the
total number of signals in the system exceeds a threshold
level [3,8]. However, this prediction is not supported by the
data: several systems have many more signals than this
threshold level, but still do not combine them (non-human
primate gestural communication, for example [9]); and the
putty-nosed monkey system described above has fewer
signals than this threshold level, but is combinatorial
nevertheless. Finally, one other analysis concludes that
combinatorial systems are more susceptible to dishonesty
than non-combinatorial systems [10]. However, this does
not explain why language should be such a clear exception.
In this paper, we develop a new explanation of the
distribution of combinatorial communication in nature. The
historical pathways by which traits evolve are an important
source of constraint on biological form [11], yet most models
of the evolution of communication, including all those focused
on combinatorial communication, ask only how one type of
communicative system can evolve from another, and not how
an initially non-communicative behaviour can take on acommu-
nicative function. Specifically, previous models do not include
strategies for signaller and receiver prior to the emergence of a
signal, despite the fact that such prior strategies are likely to
have considerable impact on the form of the eventual communi-
cation system [12,13]. We present a deterministic, nonlinear
dynamical model that includes such strategies. We use this to
derive a numberof principles regarding the origins of composite
signals, andhence show that the emergence of composite signals
is subject to significant historical constraints, to the extent that
even the most simple forms of combinatorial communication
are likely to be uncommon, and anythingmore complex vanish-
ingly so.We then argue that these constraints can be bypassed if
a species has the social cognitive abilities to communicate osten-
sively, i.e. in a way that involves the expression and recognition
of communicative and informative intentions. Humans, but
probably no other species, have this ability.
2. The emergence of communication
Before we present the model, it is necessary to briefly describe
the two classic ways in which communication systems can
emerge. In general, new signals emerge through either ritualiza-
tion or sensory manipulation (also called sensory exploitation)
[13–15]. In ritualization, previously existing cues are exapted
for use as signals (a cue is a behaviour that is informative for
other organisms, but was not selected to be so [14,16]). For
example, the use of urine to mark territorial boundaries prob-
ably first began when animals urinated simply through fear,
when they were at the edge of familiar territory. This acted as
a cue to other animals, who make use of that information.
This in turn provides a selection pressure on the focal organism
to urinate when and if it wants/needs to inform others about
the range of its territory. In sensory manipulation, previously
existingbehaviour is exapted for use as a response. For example,
male scorpionflies capture large prey and then offer them to
females who feed on them during copulation [17]. The offering
of prey by the male probably initially evolved, because the
female had a pre-existingmechanism that prioritized the oppor-
tunity to feed on largeprey, and so the presentation of foodgave
the male an opportunity to mate. There was then later positive
selection on the female to accept the prey in exchange for
copulation [14].
These processes, ritualization and sensory manipulation,
constrain the form that new signals can take. Our previous
model showed that if a particular behaviour does not exist for
reasons independent of communication prior to either of these
processes occurring, then it cannot become a signal or response,
regardless of its adaptive value for signaller or receiver [13]. Pro-
spective signals and responses must already provide fitness
benefits to either receiver or signaller, respectively, if they are
to actually evolve into signals/responses. In other words,
there must be some sort of trigger, external to the (proto-)com-
municative interaction (i.e. either a cue or a coercive behaviour),
to cause a signal to actually emerge. With this background in
place, we now develop a formal model of the emergence of
specifically combinatorial communication systems.
3. Basic set-up of model, and classification of
communication systems
The environment can be in any one of a number of different
states, . Given this state, one agent (the actor) performs
A
B
signal 
a
b
cπa + b CπA + B ZπX + Y
cπa + b C = A + B ZπX + Y
state of
world 
X
Y
effect 
A
B
a
b
X
Ycombinatorial communication
non-combinatorial 
communication
Figure 1. Combinatorial communication. In a combinatorial communication
system, two (or more) holistic signals (A and B in this figure) are combined
to form a third, composite signal (A þ B), which has a different effect (Z ) to
the sum of the two individual signals (X þ Y ). This figure illustrates the sim-
plest combinatorial communication system possible. Applied to the putty-
nosed monkey system, the symbols in this figure are: a, presence of
eagles; b, presence of leopards; c, absence of food; A, ‘pyow’; B, ‘hack’
call; C ¼ A þ B ‘pyow–hack’; X, climb down; Y, climb up; Z= X þ Y,
move to a new location. Combinatorial communication is rare in nature:
many systems have a signal C ¼ A þ B with an effect Z ¼ X þ Y; very
few have a signal C ¼ A þ B with an effect Z= X þ Y.
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an action, . Another agent (the reactor) then per-
forms a reaction, . Pay-offs are determined by the
different combinations of states and reactions. This much is
the same as the standard game-theoretic approach to model-
ling communication. However, we differ from the standard
approach in our specification of the sets In par-
ticular, in our model, these sets include default settings (E0,
A0 and R0), which correspond to the agents doing nothing,
and which are orthogonal to all other members of the set.
Typically, these default settings are not included in game-
theoretic models of communication. However, they are
critical to understanding how communication can emerge
from a state of non-communication [13].
With the exception of the defaults E0 and A0, environments
and actions can be combined with other environments and
actions. We denote these composites as Ei W Ej and Ai WAj,
respectively. These composites are, like their component
parts, members of respectively, and composition is
commutative (i.e. order does not matter, so Ei W Ej ¼ Ej W Ei
and Ai WAj ¼ Aj WAi).
A(E) and R(A) are deterministic functions of E and A,
respectively. Together, they comprise an agent’s strategy. If
there are non-composite environments Ei and Ej in which the
actions Ai and Aj are performed, then the composite action
Ai WAj is performed in the composite environment Ei W Ej. Two
agents are members of the same species if they share the
same functions A and R for all possible environments and
actions, respectively (i.e. two individuals i and j are members
of the same species Ai(E) ¼ Aj(E) 8 E and Ri(A)¼ Rj(A) 8 A).
A signal is any non-default action that yields a non-
default reaction, and any such reaction is called a response.
A communication system is a set of more than one signal–
response pair. Within a communication system, each given
pair of actions Ai and Aj (where both = A0) can be classified
in one of three ways:
— Non-composite: a pair is non-composite if the composite of
the two actions is produced only in composite environ-
ments, and it, in turn, yields the default reaction,
i.e. there is no Ek= Ei W Ej such that A(Ek) ¼ Ai WAj, and
R(Ai WAj) ¼ R0.
— Pseudo-composite: a pair is pseudo-composite if the compo-
site of the two actions is produced only in composite
environments, and it, in turn, yields a non-default reac-
tion, i.e. there is no Ek= Ei W Ej such that A(Ek) ¼ Ai WAj,
while at the same time R(Ai WAj)= R0.
— Fully-composite: a pair is fully-composite if the composite of
the two actions is produced in at least one non-composite
environment, and it in turn yields a non-default reaction, i.e.
9 Ek= Ei W Ej such that A(Ek)¼ Ai WAj, and R(Ai WAj)= R0.
A combinatorial communication system is a system that
includes at least one pair of fully-composite actions.
(Logically, there is a fourth possible class, where the compo-
site of two actions is produced in at least one non-composite
environment, and it, in turn, yields the default reaction.
However, such a pair is unstable, because the default reaction
produces only a zero pay-off for the actor, by definition, and
this is outweighed by the maintenance and production costs
of the composite pair. We therefore ignore this possibility in
the subsequent analysis.)
Communication is vulnerable to instability caused by dis-
honesty. How communication systems remain stable in the
face of this problem is an important and much studied
question for the evolution of communication [14,18].
Here, however, we are concerned with a different question,
namely assuming that communication is evolutionarily
stable, what are the different evolutionary pathways by
which (combinatorial) communication can emerge? We thus
wish to avoid issues of stability, which might complicate
our analysis, and so we assume that at least one of the differ-
ent mechanisms that can stabilize communication is in place.
In particular, we find that ascribing a direct benefit for suc-
cessful communication to both signaller and receiver [as in
e.g. 19,20], or imposing kin discrimination (i.e. agents can
observe the actions of their conspecifics only), leads to the
same set of dynamical equations (see electronic supplemen-
tary material). We expect other possible mechanisms to
lead to the same or similar principles for the emergence of
combinatorial communication as those we set out below.
4. Dynamics
We now derive the dynamics for the model. The basic prin-
ciples of the model are that: the frequency of a particular
environment is given by f (E); if an agent performs a reaction
R in the environment E, then there is a pay-off s(RjE); the
actor must also receive a pay-off, either directly or indirectly,
for communication to be stable (see above); and there is a
cost associated with each agent’s strategy, i.e. the cost of
having the capacity to behave in a non-default way in the
first place (this is x for actions and h for reactions; see
below). This is distinct from the cost associated with each
individual behaviour, which we include as part of the
pay-off s(RjE). These two types of cost can be thought of
as maintenance costs and energy costs, respectively, and the
inclusion of both is an important difference between our
model and previous models of the emergence of communi-
cation [19,20].
We first write down the dynamical equations for the fre-
quencies of the various strategies in the population, and we
define c(A,E) as the fraction of agents who perform action
A in the environment E, and f(R,A) as the fraction of
agents who perform reaction R in response to action A. As
we show in the electronic supplementary materials, we have
d
dt
cðA;EÞ ¼ cðA;EÞ

uðA;EÞ 
X
A0
uðA0;EÞcðA0;EÞ

;
where
uðA;EÞ ¼ f(E)
X
R
sðRjEÞfðR;AÞ þ
X
E0=E;E0
f ðE WE0Þ
X
R
sðRjE WE0Þ

X
A0
cðA0;EÞfðR;A WA0Þ þ xdðA;A0Þ ð4:1Þ
(d is the Kronecker delta symbol, which equals 1 if the two
arguments are identical, and 0 otherwise.) The equation has
the same structure as the replicator equation in the standard
evolutionary game theory [21], in which u(A,E) is the
fitness of the rule E! A. There are three contributions to
this fitness:
— The first term gives the fitness of the rule E! A in the
environment E, given the current distribution of the poss-
ible rules R(A).
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— The second term gives the net fitness of the rule E! A in
all the composite environments that include E, given the
current distribution of the possible rules R(A). This term
is unique to composite signals. It has the consequence
that the spontaneous emergence of composite signalling
strategies (either actions or reactions) can be favourable.
— The third term accounts for the cost, x, of having a
mechanism for producing non-default actions.
Similarly, for the frequency f(R,A) of the rule A! R, we
obtain
d
dt
fðR;AÞ  fðR;AÞ

vðR;AÞ 
X
R0
vðR0;AÞcðR0;AÞ

;
where
vðR;AÞ ¼
X
E
f ðEÞsðRjEÞcðA;EÞþ
X
kE1;E2l
f ðE1 WE2ÞsðRjE1 WE2Þ

X
ðA1;A2Þ
cðA1;E1ÞcðA2;E2ÞdðA1 WA2;AÞ þ hdðR;R0Þ:
ð4:2Þ
As above, there are three terms to this equation, which
correspond to: the fitness of the rule A! R in non-
composite environments; the average fitness of a composite
action A ¼ A1 WA2 performed in composite environments;
and the cost, h, of having a mechanism for producing non-
default reactions. Also as above, we derive this equation
step-by-step in the electronic supplementary material.
These equations can be applied to any specific set of com-
ponents, i.e. states of the environment; possible actions and
reactions; and parameters. In the electronic supplementary
material, we define these components for a specific model,
in order to test the general predictions we derive below.
Its results are entirely consistent with the principles we set
out below.
5. Three basic principles for the emergence of
combinatorial communication systems
We now derive three basic principles that govern how a com-
binatorial communication system might emerge. We are
interested, primarily, in the case where two actions, Ai and
Aj, are composed to become the action that is used to
signal an elementary environmental state Ek that is unrelated
to Ei and Ej. We will not discuss higher-order composite
actions (i.e. those where one or both components are them-
selves composite actions), but we have no reason to think
that the general principles we derive here should be any
different in that case.
5.1. Principle 1: only homogeneous populations are
evolutionarily stable
For any given environmental state, the fitness, u(A,E), of each
action rule is independent of the frequencies, c(A0,E), of its
competitors. The action rule with the highest fitness will
then grow at the expense of all its competitors until it is the
only one remaining. If two or more rules have the same fit-
ness as each other, then drift will likewise eliminate all but
one of them. These observations also apply to reaction
rules. Hence, only homogeneous populations, in which all
agents have the same set of rules, are evolutionarily stable.
We thus assume homogeneous populations in what follows.
5.2. Principle 2: new non-composite signals cannot
emerge without an external trigger
Given somepre-existing signalling system, a newnon-composite
signal is the action, A, in the set of rules E! A! R (A= A0,
R= R0), where (i) there is currently no environment in which
the new action A is performed; (ii) A is not a composite of any
two existing actions in the system and (iii) the existing reaction
to A, produced by itself or in combination with any other
action A0, is the default reaction. In a homogeneous population
(see principle 1), condition (i) implies that the first term in
equation (4.2) vanishes for both v(R,A) and v(R0,A) because
c(A,E)¼ 0 for all E; condition (ii) implies that the second term
in equation (4.2) also vanishes for both v(R,A) and v(R0,A),
because d(Ai WAj, A)¼ 0 for all Ai, Aj; and condition (iii) implies
that the first two terms of equation (4.1) are the same for both
u(A,E) and u(A0,E) because f(R0,A)¼ f(R0, A WA0)¼ d(R0,R0)
for all A0. Consequently, for any new non-composite signalling
behaviour, we always have that
uðA;EÞ  uðA0;EÞ ¼ x in any environment,
n(R;A) n(R0;A) ¼ h:
In other words, adding either the action or reaction component
of this signalling behaviour carries a cost for every individual
in the population. Hence, a completely new signalling behav-
iour that involves an action that is not currently part of the
signalling system, cannot emerge without some external trigger
as described in §2. This result is an extension of our previous
result, that a signal cannot be added to an existing state of
non-communication without an external trigger (cue or coer-
cion) [13]. The observation here is that this issue also applies to
the addition of a any non-composite signal to an existing com-
munication system. This point will be important when we
discuss human linguistic communication, in §7, below.
5.3. Principle 3: new composite signals can emerge
without an external trigger
Consider a pair of existing signals, Ai and Aj. If there is an
environment where the combination of these two signals
would provide a cue (useful information) for other organisms,
then their co-production can lead to the evolution of a compo-
site signal. More formally, if the environments Ei and Ej trigger
the actions Ai and Aj, respectively, then the composite environ-
ment Ei W Ej will trigger the composite action Ai WAj. Repeating
the analysis from principle (2), we find, again, that adding a
new action will be costly for all individuals in the population,
i.e. that u(Ai WAj, Ek)2 u(A0, Ei W Ej) ¼ 2x for all E, as before.
As with principle (2), this prevents the emergence of a compo-
site signal by sensory manipulation. However, unlike principle
(2), the emergence of a composite signal by ritualization is
possible. That is, there may be a reaction that is not yet an exist-
ing reaction to either Ai or Aj, and which would be beneficial
for the receiver to perform in the composite environment,
i.e. it is possible for v(R,A)2 v(R0,A). 0 for some R. If
this condition is satisfied, then, assuming that the relevant
environments occur sufficiently often for evolution to occur,
we should expect the corresponding reaction to evolve.
We will then have arrived at a pseudo-composite signal:
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(Ei W Ej)! (Ai WAj)! R= R0. The key observation here is that
the co-production of two existing signals can itself be the
trigger required for a new signal to emerge. This possibility
is absent in the case of non-composite signals. Note that
from here, it is then possible for a new rule Ek= (Ei W Ej)!
(Ai WAj) to emerge by sensory manipulation, giving us a
fully-composite signal. A concrete demonstration of this possi-
bility is given in the electronic supplementary material, where
we apply our model to the specific case of putty-nosed monkey
alarm calls. Note, however, that the emergence of a full-
composite signal is not guaranteed (it is possible, for example,
that reactions to higher-order compositions could prevent this).
6. Why combinatorial communication
should be rare
What do these principles imply for the emergence of a
combinatorial communication system? One immediate obser-
vation is that they explain how fully-composite signals can
emerge even in a simple world of just two existing signals.
This is noteworthy because it is contrary to a previous analy-
sis, which argued that composite signals should only emerge
within systems of multiple (more than five) signals [3]. How-
ever, the present empirical data suggest, consistent with our
analysis, that composite signals can exist even in very simple
systems (see, e.g. the putty-nosed monkey system described
in §1).
Another observation might be that the three principles
derived above seem to imply that composite signals should
be far more common than non-composite signals. After all,
composite signals can emerge without an external trigger
(principle 3), but non-composite signals cannot (principle 2).
However, this reading fails to take account of the conditions
attached to each of these possibilities. There are two in
particular that we wish to highlight.
The first is the relative frequency by which the various trig-
gers of the emergence of composite and non-composite signals
occur. In particular, although the emergence of a composite
signal does not require a trigger external to the system itself,
it does require one from within the system. This condition is
sufficiently stringent that the emergence of a composite
signal is in fact less likely to occur than the external triggers
that are required for the emergence of non-composite signals.
Here is why. The internal trigger required for the emergence of
a new composite signal is a very specific one: that, given the
co-production of two existing signals, Ai and Aj, then there is
a reaction R that (i) if it were performed in the composite
environmental state Ei W Ej, it would be beneficial to the recei-
ver; and (ii) that this reaction is not yet an existing reaction
to either Ai or Aj (see principle 3). In other, more infor-
mation-centric terms, what is required is that the co-
production of two existing signals must be informative about
some aspect of the world, beyond what can be deduced
from the meanings of the individual signals themselves—
and there is no particular reason why this should be the
case. By contrast, a new non-composite signal can emerge
from any behaviour that an individual might perform (see
§2). In other words, there is one specific way that any
new signal might be composite, but a vast number of ways,
limited only by the number of behaviours the organism
can actually perform, that any new signal might be non-
composite. Consequently, composite signals should be rare.
This is not to say that they cannot emerge, only that their
emergence is dependent on unlikely prior circumstances.
Hence, they should be rare, at least in comparison with non-
composite signals.
The second condition attached to the emergence of fully-
composite signals is that it is dependent on the instability of
other possible systems. Consider a basic system of Ei ! Ai !
Ri and Ej ! Aj ! Rj (i.e. just the first two signals in figure 1).
Principle 3 states that it is then possible for a fully-composite
signal Ek ! (Ai WAj)! Rk to emerge, to form the system
described in figure 1, without an external trigger. However,
it turns out that this is only true if the alternative system, of
the basic system plus a holistic signal Ek ! Ak ! Rk is
unstable. Here is why. In order for the process described in
principle 3 to occur, the basic system must be unstable to
the addition of (Ai WAj)! Rk. A necessary condition for
this to be the case is that in this system, v(Rk,Ai WAj) .
v(R0,Ai WAj). Using the equation for v(R,A) in §4, we find
that for this instability to be present, we require
f ðEi WEjÞ½sðRkjEi WEjÞ  sðR0jEi WEjÞ  h . 0: ð6:1Þ
However, using the same equation for v(R,A), but now
applied to the alternative system (i.e. the one that includes
Ek ! Ak ! Rk rather than Ek ! (Ai WAj)! Rk), we find that
for this alternative system to be stable we require
f(Ei WEj)[s(RkjEi WEj) s(R0jEi WEj)] h , 0: ð6:2Þ
Equations (6.1) and (6.2) clearly contradict each other. This
shows that the conditions required for the process described
in principle 3 to occur include that the alternative system is
evolutionarily unstable (note that this is true whether or not
the fully-compositional system described in figure 1 is evolu-
tionarily stable). As such, this is an additional criterion on the
emergence of composite signals, and hence on the emergence
of combinatorial communication.
In sum, there are at least two conditions that can work to
restrict the emergence of composite signals. The first is that
the triggers required for the emergence of composite signals
are less likely to occur than are the triggers for non-composite
signals. The second is that the process of emergence without an
external trigger depends on the instability of any alternative,
holistic system. Both these conditions are the consequence of
the interdependence of signals and responses, and they help
to explain why combinatorial communication is rare in nature.
7. Human linguistic communication
There is, of course, one extreme exception to the norm of non-
combinatorial communication: human linguistic communi-
cation. Here, meaningless sounds (phonemes) are combined
into meaningful units (morphemes), which are, in turn, com-
bined into utterances, whose meaning is a function not only
of the morphemes involved, but also the order in which
they are combined (a feature called duality of patterning:
[22,23]). This combinatorial richness gives language its
expressive power [5,24]. How can we explain why language
is such a clear exception to the general trend for non-
combinatorial systems? In this section, we use the conclusions
from our model to pinpoint and articulate an important
difference between human and animal communication. We
hence argue that human linguistic communication is simply
not subject to the various historical contingencies described
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in the previous sections—and consequently, combinatorial
communication is free to emerge wherever it may be useful.
Human communication depends, at bottom, on mechan-
isms of metapsychology: that is, the ability to reason about
others’ reasons, intentions, beliefs and so on. Communication
of this sort is called ostensive communication [25]. Linguistic com-
munication is an instance of ostensive communication that has
been made expressively powerful by the development of rich
suite of communicative conventions that allow it to be used
far more precisely and expressively than it otherwise would
[26]. A signaller can, for example, ostensively point to any of
the objects in this room, but with language she can refer to
any object in the world. She also can make a request of others
by, for example ostensively pushing unchopped vegetables,
and a knife, in their direction, but with language she can
make requests about things remote in time and space. Other
examples are not hard to imagine. By contrast, most, and per-
haps all, animal communication depends on mechanisms of
association: causal relationships between stimuli and responses
(but see below). Communication of this sort is called coded
communication (see references [25–27] for discussion of the
difference between coded and ostensive communication).
Our model in this paper has been a model of coded com-
munication: we have studied how states of the world become
associated with certain actions, and how these actions, in turn,
become associatedwith certain reactions. Indeed, all models of
animal communication that study the emergence of such
associations are code models. However, such models do not
capture an important fact about ostensive communication:
that meaning is not deduced or calculated, even probabilisti-
cally, on the back of associations (be they between signal and
meaning, or perhaps between signals, context and meaning),
but rather it is inferred, based on the receiver’s beliefs about
the signaller’s intentions [25]. This inference is, unlike the
associations that make coded communication possible,
made possible by metapsychology [27].
One consequence of this difference is that human osten-
sive communication, including linguistic communication, is
inherently prone to ambiguity. This is generally seen as a
defective quality, because it can, on occasion, lead to misun-
derstanding and other failures of communication. However,
it also allows communication to be used in flexible, creative
and open-ended ways—and these ways include the combi-
nation of already existing signals. One consequence of this
is that the spaces of possible signal forms and signal mean-
ings become continuous, rather than become discrete. This
development is possible only because signallers have the
metapsychological abilities to create the right sort of signal
to express their intended meaning, whatever it might be,
and because receivers have similar abilities to infer those
intended meanings.
Here is an example. Homesigners are deaf children born to
hearing parents. Lacking the input of a conventional sign
language, they must create new communication systems them-
selves, and this includes the combination of existing signals
[28]. Here is one very simple case [28]. The child, Karen, is
already familiar with pointing, and also with a ‘twist’ gesture
that means ‘open’. She then uses these two behaviours
together: she points to a jar of soap bubbles and then, without
pausing, produces an iconic ‘twist’ action with her hands. In
doing so, she indicates to the adult that she would like her to
open the jar. At first blush, this seems unremarkable, but that
is only because, as fluent users of ostensive communication,
we are fully accustomed to such acts of creation as an everyday
occurrence. The point here is not that we can combine things
together. It is rather that, because she has the required meta-
psychological abilities, it is possible for Karen to provide just
the right sort of evidence, given her intended meaning and
her intended audience. This is ostensive communication. It
just happens that in this case the right sort of evidence happens
to involve the combination of two existing signals.
Note that in a different context, the meaning of Karen’s
behaviour could be very different indeed. Suppose, for example,
that the adult had just tried to open the jar by twisting it, but had
failed, and that this had amused Karen. Now Karen could use
the same combined signal to make a humorous reference to
this past event. This flexibility is possible only because both
Karen and the adult have the metapsychological abilities
required. On the ostensive side, Karen produced the signals in
such a way that it was apparent that they are in fact one
signal, comprised of two parts; this is why she does not pause
between the two. On the inferential side, the adult must assess
what Karen’s intended meaning was, given her knowledge of
the context, and of the meanings of the two component parts.
Here is how this example relates to our model. Karen has
an existing set of actions that she produces in particular
environments, and these receive particular responses from
the adult. Specifically
E1 ¼ Karen wants to refer to an out-of-reach object;
A1 ¼ pointing;
R1 ¼ attention is focused in the direction of the point;
E2 ¼ Karen wants the adult to open something;
A2 ¼ ‘twist’ gesture; and
R2 ¼ the adult opens the object of mutual attention.
Karen finds herself in a new environment: E3 ¼ Karen wants
the adult to open an out-of-reach object. Note that this
environment is not the sum of the other two: E3= E1 W E2.
Instead, the composite environment E1 W E2 is the co-
occurrence of (i) an object that is out-of-reach object; and
(ii) an object that Karen wishes to open. There is nothing in
this that specifies that these two objects should in fact be
the same object: that aspect of the scenario is additional,
and as such is specific to E3. Our model shows that, without
an external trigger to set the evolutionary process in motion,
it is not possible, in a coded communication system, for
a new, non-composite signal such as this to emerge (princi-
ple 2, above). Yet here, not only does such a signal emerge,
it does so immediately, and smoothly: there is no interruption
of the normal flow of communication. Neither is this an
instance of the emergence of communication by ritualization,
in which a cue evolves into a signal (see principle 3, above)—
because Karen’s behaviour is not a cue. It is a signal from the
moment of its production, and that is the point. As such, this
is a clear exception to the general constraints described pre-
viously. In sum, the existence of ostensive communication
makes it possible for a species to overcome the constraints,
described above, that otherwise make the emergence of
combinatorial communication unlikely.
There is, then, an important sense in which Karen’s twist
signal contrasts with superficially similar signals in a coded
communication system. Coded ‘combinatorial’ signals are in
a sense not really combinatorial at all. After all, there is no
‘combining’ going on. There is really just a third holistic
signal, which happens to be comprised of the same pieces
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as other existing holistic signals. Indeed, the most recent
experimental results suggest that the putty-nosed monkeys
interpret the ‘combinatorial’ pyow–hack calls in exactly this
idiomatic way, rather than as the product of two component
parts of meaning [29]. By contrast, the ostensive creation of
new composite signals is clearly combinatorial: the meaning
of the new, composite signal is in part (but only in part) a
function of the meanings of the component pieces.
It is presently unclear whether any other species uses osten-
sive communication. The precise psychological mechanisms
necessary are cognitively complex, and so it is quite possible
that it is uniquely human [30–32]. Certainly, this would be
consistent with the argument we have developed in this paper,
and there is presently no convincing evidence that any other
species communicates ostensively [30,32]. However, this
remains, at least for now, an open empirical question. (Note
that ostensive communication is not the same thing as intentional
communication, which some other species certainly do use.)
8. Conclusion
Previous models of the emergence of combinatorial com-
munication were focused on the following question: under
what circumstances are composite signals advantageous, in
comparison with holistic signals? Our model in this paper
addresses a different question: by what processes can compo-
site signals emerge? To do this, we explicitly modelled the
possibility that no communication might take place: this is
why our model includes the default states E0, A0 and R0,
which are absent from other models. Our results show that
combinatorial communication is rare in nature, because
the interdependence of signals and responses constrains the
ways by which communication systems emerge, with
the effect that novel signals will tend to be holistic rather
than tend to be composite. However, this constraint can be
bypassed if the communication system in question is osten-
sive—and this type of communication is likely unique to
humans. Unlike other proposals (see Introduction), this
explanation is consistent with all the empirical facts: it
explains both why combinatorial communication is generally
rare in the natural world, and why there is a single, extreme
exception to this trend.
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